crisisaee

LAS OPINIONES Y LA AEE

                                                                        “Opinions are like asses, everybody has one”

La Primera Enmienda a la Constitución de los USA entrona el derecho a la libre expresión. Incluida entre ellas está el de la opinión incorrecta. El problema es que los políticos boricuas y sus secuaces llevan este derecho a la exageración. Ejemplo de ello son dos columnas en Metro de Juan Manuel Frontera, Vice-Presidente de Proyecto Dignidad y Jesús Manuel Ortiz del PPD.

El señor Frontera, dice en su columna lo siguiente:

Aquí hay que tener algo claro, los bonistas no ven en la AEE la fuente de repago para su acreencia. Actualmente la AEE son cables, torres, postes y plantas generatrices que no llega ni a cubrir una tercera parte de la deuda. En cualquier proceso de quiebra de cualquier corporación los acreedores cobran de los bienes de la corporación. Si le prestas a una corporación, quien paga es la corporación. No obstante, estos bonistas no les interesa cobrar de los bienes de la AEE, sino que les interesa cobrar de los clientes de la AEE, esto es, los bolsillos de la familia puertorriqueña.

Desgraciadamente, esto lo que demuestra es total ignorancia del Título III de PROMESA y lo que son los bonos de la AEE. Estos bonos, en mi opinión, son non-recourse bonds, lo cual quiere decir que se cobran de la tarifa que pagan los abonados de la AEE. Más aún, la Junta va a litigar un caso para demostrar que esa es la única fuente de repago porque así los bonistas no tendrían control de los haberes de la AEE, la generación, distribución y transmisión. Además, hablar de quiebras en general es incorrecto ya que el Título III está basado en el Capítulo 9 de la ley de Quiebras, que es uno sui generis donde se hace claro que es diferente a los demás capítulos. Por lo tanto, los bonistas no pueden cobrar como quiere el Sr. Frontea. La diferencia mayor, como traté de explicar en Twitter a una Doctora en Historia que me porfiaba el punto, en Capítulo 9 y el Título III, NO HAY LIQUIDACIÓN como el Capítulo 7 de Quiebras. Por lo tanto, las elucubraciones mentales del Sr. Frontera carecen de base en la realidad.

El Representante Jesús Manuel Ortiz, a quien aprecio y distingo, culpa a Pierluisi por la oferta de la Junta en julio de 2022 a los bonistas de $23 por abonado a 35 años. Aparte que esa es la oferta de la Junta y por la secretividad de la mediación no sabemos cual era la posición de AFFAF sobre ello, ¿en serio alguien cree que llegar a un acuerdo con los bonistas, fuel line lenders, el Retiro de la AEE, la Utier y los Acreedores no Asegurados no va a forzar un aumento en la tarifa de electricidad? Llevamos 8 años sin pagar el principal de los bonos de la AEE y 6 años sin pagar un centavo. Obvio que se va a aumentar, la pregunta es cuanto.

El Representante, quien es también abogado de reciente cuño, argumenta que Pierluisi se alía con la Junta el vetar el PC 1383 y que este hubiera resuelto nuestros problemas con la AEE al imponer límites al plan de ajuste. Yo hice una reseña del PC 1383 y detalle porque era contrario a PROMESA y la Junta lo detendría. Ver aquí.  Solo para que se entienda lo risible del PC 1383, imponía un límite de 20 centavos por kilovatio hora, cosa que ni existe en este momento. Como digo frecuentemente, los legisladores piensan que con legislar pueden cambiar la realidad.

El tema de la AEE es uno complicado y en nada abona la “opiniones” que son claramente fuera de la realidad e ignoran los entuertos legales que existen. Antes de hablar y publicar, estudien.

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PREPA DEAL GONE WRONG

 

 

On Friday night we all went to bed thinking PREPA had obtained a new extension but woke up to the end of the Forbearance Agreement. On the one hand, PREPA says the bondholders wanted further guarantees before they lent it $115 million such as the approval of the Energy Board to the rate increase, which would take months without PS 1523 being approved. On the other hand, the bondholders blame PREPA for the break-up of negotiations.

 

What happened? What are the implications of what we know? Let’s see the history of this problem.

 

PREPA realized in June of 2014 that it would not be able to pay its bondholders in July. The Board brought the problem to the Governor and it decided to take the money to pay bondholders from reserves. This was a technical default of the 1974 PREPA Bondholders Agreement. Due to this, PREPA and its bondholders sat down to talk. On August 14, 2014, PREPA announced agreements with its creditors, the so-called “Forbearance Agreement”, which included that the company had to hire a restructuring officer that would be approved by the Forbearing Bondholders. As per the agreement, on March 2, 2015, PREPA was to deliver a business plan and the agreement was to expire on March 31. On March 30, PREPA announced a 15-day extension on the Forbearance Agreement. On April 15, it announced another 15-day extension and on April 30, 2015, one until June 4, 2015. On June 1, PREPA presented to bondholders the Recovery Plan but not to the public.

 

On June 5, PREPA announced another extension to the Forbearance Agreement until June 18, 2015. On June 18, another extension was announced until June 30, 2015. On July 1, 2015, an extension was announced until September 15. On September 2, 2015, PREPA announces agreement with 35% of its bondholders. On September 21, an extension was announced until October 1, 2015, which was again extended to October 15, which was again extended on October 23 until October 30. It was extended again until November 3. On November 3, the Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA) is announced and on November 10, 2015, Ms. Lisa Donahue testified before the PR Senate Energy Commission on behalf of the PREPA Revitalization Act, which implements parts of the RSA. The RSA states RSA that PREPA must make a rate review request from the PR Energy Board no later than December 21 and that the Legislature must approve the bill no later than November 20 2015. It also states that the rate increase must be in place on or before March 1, 2016 pages 31-32 of the RSA.

Since the bill, PS 1523, had been filed on November 4 and had 159 pages, the legislators, with good reason demurred. Subsequently, everyone assumed Governor García Padilla would call for an extraordinary but he refused. The RSA was extended to December 17 and then December 23 and finally to January 22. On December 23, PREPA announced an agreement with the monolines and now had 70% of bondholders on line with the RSA.

Continuing with these events, Ms. Donahue told the US Congress on January 11, 2016 that PREPA could not get a better deal in Chapter 9 or that its rates would go down under that regime starting at 1.07 minutes Moreover, she said PREPA would run out of money to pay for fuel and that there would be blackouts.  See also Ms. Donahue’s testimony at 1.19 minutes.

What does all this mean? Why has a deal with 70% of bondholders on board, vital to PREPA gone down the tubes? We don’t know yet but there are various possibilities. I have always believed PS 1523 did not have the votes to be approved in the House where a group of six leftists legislators could with three votes block any legislation. Also, the PR Legislature wanted to change the bill substantially. Obviously, this is not what bondholders wanted to hear.

Today, Governor García Padilla made a press release emphasizing the need for the PREPA bill to be approved, but he forgets he did not call for an extraordinary session to discuss the law in December, wasting precious time. In addition, he said, “Our legislature has requested more time to bring to the table other options, other proposals.” After 18 months of negotiations, it is surprising and irresponsible for the legislature to require time to bring about “other options, other proposals.” Good or bad, Ms. Donahue is the person designated by PREPA to do the negotiations, which were approved by the PREPA Governing Board. To change things now would mean months of negotiations and the distinct possibility that bondholders would not accept them.

The more we read of this press release, the more it is obvious that the Governor does not have control of his Legislature. Also, although the Governor acknowledges the need for the agreement due to the difficult situation with PRASA and the Government’s debt, he arrogantly says at the end of the press release “I warn creditors, at the same time, it is not time for pressure games. I accept reasons, not pressures.”

It almost seems that the Governor, PREPA and their advisors have decided to scuttle the agreement in order to push Congress for a Chapter 9. It was clear that this agreement belittled the need for PR to have access to bankruptcy. By playing the blame game, PR could be hoping to move a reluctant Congress. The problem with that is that now creditors can claim that PREPA did not negotiate in good faith, a requirement of Chapter 9, see, 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). Bondholders accepted haircuts, offered to provide money, granted several extensions to continue negotiating, all to naught. In any event, this situation will make the eligibility issue a mayor battle if Chapter 9 was authorized for PR.

Question is, what now? Bondholders could decide to buckle and accept PREPA’s refusal and continue negotiating a deal until July when the company must pay over $400 million in bonds as well as over $700 million to banks for fuel purchase. On the other hand, bondholders could get tough and file on Monday a request in federal court for the appointment of a receiver to run PREPA and get paid. Or they could do both. Who wins? The lawyers involved in the litigation. Let’s see what happens.

PREPA’S FUTURE

This past week was an incredible whirlwind for PREPA. The Forbearance agreement with bondholders required PREPA to provide a business plan by December 15, 2014 and a “recovery program or debt enforcement plan” by March 2, 2015. It complied with neither. Ms. Lisa Donahue informed the public that PREPA had requested an extension until June to provide them but the forbearing bondholders remained silent.

During the weekend of March 27-29, PREPA and the bondholders continued negotiations to see if the authority would have to pay the banks $671 million once the Forbearing Agreement expired on March 31st. What we got was an agreement to extend the period to negotiate and the Forbearance until April 15 but at any time during this period 25% of the holders of interest could terminate the agreement.

During the negotiations, some say March 15, the Amendment to the Forbearance says March 26, the bondholders gave PREPA a proposal by Houlihan Lokey, PA Consulting and GE which was released to the public on March 31 The gist of the proposal is that these entities will provide funding to finish Aguirre, not increase rates and add more employment and renewable energy sources. Sounded great, maybe too great.

PREPA and Ms. Lisa Donahue were not happy with the disclosure of the offer by Houlihan & Co. Obviously, losing control of the plum of generation, the Aguirre plant and having to buy the electricity it generates does not seem to be appreciated by PREPA. Ms. Donahue hinted that the disclosure to the public was not complete but provided no new information. As usual, Governor García Padilla maintained his silence as if it were not with him or he was not in charge of Puerto Rico. Or perhaps he is waiting for Congress to amend Chapter 9 so he can continue controlling PREPA? The only problem is that Congress will not very likely act within the next eleven days, which is all the time left.

All this leaves the Puertorrican consumer floundering around. The consumer of electricity knows that PREPA has been floating around the idea of a rate increase and Houlihan’s offer seems to put that to rest. If PREPA does not accept the Houlihan offer, passed down with what one can assume is the Bondholders’ blessing, it could force them to withdraw from the agreement and proceed to sue the authority. What could happen later? The banks could sue PREPA for the $671 million and eventually win. Since the banks are not bondholders, the could not trigger the 1974 Trust Agreement remedies or 22 L.P.R.A § 207(b) remedies. As little as 25% of the Bondholders could, however, request a receiver pursuant to the aforementioned section and proceed to administer PREPA, with the probable power to raise rates. Whether this receiver would have the power to get into an agreement with Houlihan is questionable, however. When the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority of PR was to be administered by another entity, legislation had to be enacted. But if the Houlihan offer is declined, Bondholders may have no other recourse. Moreover, all this must be decided on or before April 15, 2015.

In any event, Houlihan’s offer should be carefully examined. The problem is that PREPA is as opaque as usual and will not provide the consumer with the information we need in order to understand what is being offered and if it is good or not so good. It seems that our political leaders have once again decided to deny us knowledge.