On September 24, 2015, a group of senior bondholders of COFINA, which claim to hold 25% of the principal amount of the debt, sent the Government Development Bank (GDB) a letter objecting to the Puerto Rico Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan’s supposed comingling of COFINA and Commonwealth debt. COFINA bondholders’ position is that this debt is totally separate from Commonwealth debt and by lumping them together, PR Government is violating the Amended and Restated Sales Tax Revenue Bond Resolution. The letter states, inter alia,

Moreover, pages 6 and 65 of the Working Group Plan assume “the clawback of revenues supporting certain Commonwealth tax supported debt” may be available to “service all principal and interest on debt that has a constitutional priority.” While the only lawful interpretation of those passages is that they refer to those bonds that are expressly subject to “clawback,” such significant statements by the Commonwealth should not be left open to interpretation.

These are not minor errors or mere oversights. Rather, the Working Group Plan materially misrepresents the essential nature of COFINA’s indebtedness to the investing public, and materially harms COFINA and its bondholders. It misleads the public by lumping the Commonwealth’s own debt together with COFINA’s (and thus should be treated similar to other Commonwealth debt) when in fact the opposite is true. Specifically, in the Working Group Plan, the GDB and the Commonwealth attempt to consolidate assets and liabilities of COFINA with that of the Commonwealth. There is no doubt that this is intended as a signal to the investing public at large that the Commonwealth’s struggling fiscal health threatens the health of COFINA, ignoring the fact that insulation from the Commonwealth’s other liabilities prompted the creation of COFINA in the first place. Consolidation of COFINA’s debts with the Commonwealth’s obligations will raise future borrowing costs and limit the Commonwealth’s revitalization.

The Working Group Plan’s material misstatements could open up the Commonwealth and all those responsible for the statements to potential liability. . .

Consistent with section 704 of the Resolution, COFINA should promptly cure the misstatements and provide the necessary assurances of rights of bondholders under the Resolution. It is important that you promptly perform your ministerial duty to untangle the COFINA debt and revenue from that of the Commonwealth. Doing so is necessary to avoid a breach of the Resolution and potential liability, and to fulfill the clear legal commitments made by the Commonwealth.

The purpose of the letter is not clear at first glance and an explanation is needed. The PR Government, probably under the advice of Millco Advisors and Cleary Gottlieb, has been trying to create a conflict between COFINA bondholders and GO bondholders. The old idea of “divide and conquer”. Each time a COFINA bond issue was done, there were three legal opinions stating that the revenue from the sales tax would not be part of the available revenues for payment of GO’s as per the Constitution. In other words, COFINA funds could not be used to pay GO’s. Whether this is true, it is irrelevant at this stage, but COFINA bondholders do not want the Government hinting that it could happen as the Puerto Rico Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan hints.

In the letter, COFINA bondholders demand that PR make a clear statement that their funds cannot be used to pay GO’s (as the PR Department of Justice has said every time there is a bond issue). What if PR does not make this clear statement? Here is where the COFINA AMENDED AND RESTATED BOND RESOLUTION comes in.

The letter requires the GDB to comply with its ministerial duty, i.e., if you don’t comply, I am going to slap you with a mandamus, which is a special writ in equity or complaint to require the Government to do something which is part of its ministerial duties, this duty being, protecting bondholders’ position of NO CLAWBACK. Moreover, the COFINA Bondholders’ Resolution at page 79, states as follows:

In addition, the Trustee may, and upon the written request of the Owners of not less than twenty-five per centum (25%) in principal amount of the Outstanding Bonds, shall, proceed to protect and enforce its rights and the rights of the Bondowners by such of the following remedies, as the Trustee, being advised by counsel shall deem most effectual to protect and enforce such rights subject to the provisions of Sections 201, 803 and 1206:

. . .

(iv) by action or suit in equity, to enjoin any acts or things which may be unlawful or in violation of the rights of the Bondowners or the Beneficiaries.

The COFINA bondholders have a very solid legal point that they can sue in equity to force the GDB and COFINA to make such statement. If a suit ensues, it will be difficult for PR to claim that clawback is possible since the Secretary of Justice has said time and again it cannot occur. Question now is, will COFINA bondholders follow through on their threat, and if so, in which court?



Gov. Alejandro Garcia Padilla insists on the creation of a local Financial Control Board. In Washington they tell us the following about the local board:

            We will see what the law says, but an example may be that the      creditor agreed upon fiscal control (which the government of Puerto Rico has to comply). If Puerto Rico fails, then negotiation or early maturing of bonds or (would have to pay) the original price.  Things like that can certify the external board, certifying that things are going well.

This is so ridiculous that makes you want to cry. The governor is telling us about the local Financial Control Board since the 29th of June.  The board appears on the Krueger report and Melba Acosta spoke about it.  I wrote that the concept was unconstitutional as conceived by these people since the concept ran into the harsh reality of our Constitution and now seeks to do otherwise. His ideas, however, are laughable. I explain.

The Governor speaks of a board certifying that the government is in compliance or not with agreements with bondholders. What relevance, if any, would this have? If the bondholders believe that the Government is in compliance, the opinion of the board would be irrelevant. If bondholders do not believe that the Government is in compliance, the opinion of the Board would be irrelevant. Moreover, what confidence could bondholders have on Board partial or totally appointed by the Government?

In addition, the role of the Government is to ensure that its agencies comply with their obligations. Delegating that responsibility to a locally appointed Board solves nothing, especially when this function can be delegated to an arbitrator in arbitration proceedings (if it is agreed upon in the bond document) or a court of competent jurisdiction.

Clearly the idea of ​​ this Board is to appease Washington. The Governor does not know how the proposed legislation will red and knows that the Board will have no powers to compel the Government or the Legislature to comply with the agreements. Just saying that it fulfills or not with the agreements does not force anyone. Finally, faced with a government that already threatens to violate the Constitution by not paying general obligation bonds, what guarantees do the bondholders have that it would comply with what is said by a Board? What guarantee is there that the government will not go to a court to say that the Board is wrong? The audacity of this Government has no limit.



El Gobernador Alejandro García Padilla insiste en la creación de una Junta de Control Financiero local. En Washington nos dicen lo siguiente sobre la Junta local:

Hay que ver qué dice la legislación, pero un ejemplo puede ser que el acreedor pacte unos controles fiscales (que el gobierno de Puerto Rico tiene que cumplir). Si Puerto Rico incumple, entonces se cae la negociación o el bono madura más temprano o (se tiene que pagar) al precio original. Cosas como esas las puede certificar una junta externa, certificar que las cosas se están haciendo bien.

Esto es tan ridículo que dan ganas de llorar. El Gobernador nos esta hablando de la Junta de Control Financiero local desde el 29 de junio. Aparece la Junta en el informe Krueger y Melba Acosta habló sobre ello. Escribí por que el concepto era inconstitucional como lo concebían estas personas Su concepción se topó con la dura realidad de nuestra constitución y ahora pretenden hacerlo de otra forma. Sus ideas, sin embargo, son risibles. Me explico.

El Gobernador habla de una Junta certificar que el gobierno esta o no en cumplimiento. ¿Que peso, si alguno, tendría esto? Si los bonistas creen que el Gobierno esta en cumplimiento, la opinión de la Junta sería irrelevante. Si los bonistas no creen que el Gobierno no esta en cumplimiento, la opinión de la Junta sería irrelevante. Más aún, ¿que confianza podrían tener bonistas de una Junta parcial o totalmente nombrada por el propio deudor?

Además, es función del Gobierno asegurarse que sus agencias cumplan con sus obligaciones. Delegar esta función a una Junta nada resuelve, especialmente cuando esta función la puede hacer un arbitro en procedimiento de arbitraje (si se pacta en el bono) o un tribunal de jurisdicción competente.

Claramente la idea de una Junta es para apaciguar a Washington. El mismo Gobernador no sabe como va a ser la legislación propuesta y sabe que la Junta no tendrá los poderes de obligar al Gobierno o la Legislatura a cumplir con los acuerdos. El solo decir que se cumple o no con los acuerdos no obliga nadie. Finalmente, ante un Gobierno que ya amenaza violar la Constitución al no pagar los bonos de obligación general, ¿que garantía tendrían los bonistas de que obedecerá lo dicho por una Junta? ¿Que garantía hay de que el Gobierno no acuda a un Tribunal a decir que la Junta se equivoca? La desfachatez del Gobierno no tiene límite.